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Abstract.  Intrusion detection for computer network systems  becomes 
one  of the  most  critical  tasks  for network administrators today. It  has 
an  important role  for  organizations, governments and  our  society  due 
to  its  valuable resources  on computer networks. Traditional misuse  de- 
tection strategies are  unable  to detect new and  unknown intrusion. Be- 
sides,  anomaly detection in  network security is aim  to  distinguish be- 
tween illegal or malicious events and normal  behavior of network systems. 
Anomaly  detection can  be considered as a classification problem  where 
it  builds  models  of normal   network behavior, which  it  uses  to  detect 
new patterns that significantly deviate from the  model.  Most  of the  cur- 
rent research  on anomaly detection is based  on the  learning  of normally 
and  anomaly behaviors. They  do not  take  into  account the  previous,  re- 
cent  events  to  detect the  new incoming  one.  In  this  paper, we propose 
a real time  collective  anomaly detection model based  on neural  network 
learning  and  feature operating. Normally a  Long  Short-Term  Memory 
Recurrent Neural  Network  (LSTM  RNN)  is trained only on normal  data 
and  it  is capable  of predicting several  time  steps  ahead  of an  input. In 
our  approach, a  LSTM  RNN  is trained with  normal   time  series  data 
before performing a live prediction for each time step.  Instead of con- 
sidering  each  time  step  separately, the  observation of prediction errors 
from a certain number of time  steps  is now proposed  as a new idea  for 
detecting collective  anomalies. The  prediction errors  from  a number of 
the latest time steps  above a threshold will indicate a collective anomaly. 
The model is built  on a time series version of the KDD 1999 dataset. The 
experiments demonstrate that it is possible  to offer reliable  and  efficient 
for collective  anomaly detection. 
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1    Introduction 
	  
Network anomaly detection  refers to the problem of detecting  illegal or malicious 
activities  or events from normal connections or expected behavior of network sys- 
tems [4, 5]. It has become one of the most concerned subjects  in network security 
domain  due to the  fact  that organizations or governments are now seeking for 
	  
	  
	  
	  
good solutions  to  protect their  valuable  resources  on computer networks  from 
unauthorized and  illegal accesses,  network  attacks or  malware.  Over  the  last 
three decades, machine learning techniques  are known as a common approach for 
developing network anomaly detection  models [3, 4]. Network anomaly detection 
is usually posed as a type of classification  problem: given a dataset representing 
normal  and anomalous  examples,  the goal is to build a learning  classifier which 
is capable  of signaling when a new anomalous  data  sample is encountered [5]. 
	  
However,  most  of the  existing  approaches consider  an  anomaly  as a single 
point:  cases when they  occur “individually” and  “separately” [6, 7, 16]. In such 
approaches, anomaly  detection  models do not  have the  ability  to represent the 
information from previous  data  or events for evaluating a current point.  In net- 
work security,  some kinds of attacks, Denial of Service  (DoS),  usually  occur for 
a long period  of time  (several  minutes) [10], and  are often represented by a set 
of single points.  An attack will be indicated  only if a set of single points are 
considered  as attack. In order  to  detect  this  kinds  of attacks, anomaly  detec- 
tion  models should be capable  of remembering the  information from a number 
of previous  events,  and representing the relationship between  them  and current 
event.  To avoid  important mistakes,  one must  always  consider  every outcome: 
in this sense a highly anomalous  value may still be linked to a perfectly  normal 
condition,  and  conversely.  In this  work, we aim to build  an anomaly  detection 
model for this kinds of attacks (known  as collective anomaly  mentioned in [5]). 
	  
Collective  anomaly  is the  term  to refer to a collection of related  anomalous 
data  instances  with  respect  to the  whole dataset [5]. The  single data  points  in 
a  collective  anomaly  may  not  be considered  as  anomalies  by  themselves,  but 
the occurrence  of these single points  together  indicates  an anomaly.  Long Short 
Term  Memory  Recurrent  Neural  Network  (LSTM  RNN)  is known  as  one  of 
powerful techniques  to represent the relationship between current event and 
previous  events,  and  handles  time  series problems  [12, 14]. Thus,  it is employed 
to develop anomaly  detection  model in this paper. 
	  
In this paper,  we will propose a collective anomaly  detection  model by using 
the  predictive  power  of LSTM  RNN  [8]. Firstly,  LSTM  RNN  is applied  as  a 
time  series  anomaly  detection   model.  The  prediction   of a  current  event  will 
depend  on both  the  current event and  its previous  events.  Secondly, the  model 
will be adapted to detect  collective anomaly  by proposing  a circular  array.  The 
circular array  contains  the prediction  errors from a certain  number  of latest  time 
steps. If the prediction errors in the circular array  are higher than  predeterminer 
threshold  and last for a certain  time steps,  it will indicate  a collective anomaly. 
More details  will be described  in Section 4. 
	  
The  rest  of the  paper  is organized  as follows. We briefly review some work 
related  to anomaly  detection  and LSTM RNN. In Section 3, we give a short  in- 
troduction to LSTM RNN. This is followed by a section proposing the collective 
anomaly  detection  model using LSTM RNN. Experiments, Results  and Discus- 
sion are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively.  The paper  concludes 
with highlights  and future  directions. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
2    Related Work 
	  
	  
When considering a time series dataset, point anomalies are often directly linked 
to the  value of the  considered  sample.  However, attempting real time  collective 
anomaly detection  implies always being aware of previous samples, and more 
precisely  their  behavior.  This  means  that every  time  step  should  include  an 
evaluation of the  current value combined  with the  evolution  of precedent infor- 
mation.  In this  section,  we briefly describe  work related  applying  LSTM  RNN 
to time series and collective anomaly  detection  problems  [12, 14, 15]. 
Olsson et al. [15] proposed an unsupervised approach for detecting collective 
anomaly.  In order to detect  a group of the anomalous  examples, the “anomalous 
score” of the group of data  points was probabilistically aggregated from the 
contribution of each individual examples. Obtaining the collective anomalous was 
processed under  unsupervised manner,  thus  it is suitable  for both  unsupervised 
and  supervised  learning  anomaly  techniques   to  scoring  individual   anomalies. 
The  model was evaluated on an  artificial  dataset and  two  industrial datasets, 
detecting  anomalies  in moving cranes and anomalies  in fuel consumption. 
In [12], Malhotra et  al. applied  LSTM  network  for addressing  the  problem 
of time  series anomaly  detection. The  stacked  LSTM  network  trained on only 
normal  data  was used  to  predict  over a number  of time  steps.  They  assumed 
that the resulting  prediction  errors has a Gaussian  distribution, which was used 
to assess the likelihood of anomaly behavior.  Their  model was demonstrated 
performing  well on four datasets. 
Marchi  et  al.  [14, 13] presented a novel  approach by  combining  non-linear 
predictive  denoising autoencoders (DA) with LSTM for identifying abnormal 
acoustic signals. Firstly,  LSTM Recurrent DA was employed to predict  auditory 
spectral  features  of the next short-term frame from its previous frames. The net- 
work trained on normal  acoustic  recorders tends  to behave well on normal  data, 
and yields small reconstruction errors whereas the reconstruction errors from ab- 
normal  acoustic  signals are high. The  reconstruction errors  of the  autoencoder 
was used as “anomaly  score”, the reconstruction error above a pre-determine 
threshold  indicates  an novel acoustic  event.  The  model was trained on a public 
dataset containing  in-home sound events,  and  evaluated on a dataset including 
new more anomaly events. The results demonstrated that their model performed 
significantly  better than  exsiting methods. 
The  idea is also used in a practical acoustic  example  [14, 13], where LSTM 
RNNs are used to predict  short-term frames.  The  core idea of this  paper  is to 
combine the previous methods,  to adapt Long Short-Term Memory to collective 
anomaly  detection. By labelling testing  LSTM RNN outputs at every time step 
with a standardized error value, we shall propose an algorithm to detect collective 
anomalies. This will prove very useful in our example : First,  we will train  normal 
data  on an LSTM RNN in order  to estimate  the  behaviour  of a normal  day of 
traffic. Then,  we will use a classifier inspired by [15] to rate  the level of anomaly 
of each time  sample.  We will apply  this  method  to a network  security  problem 
(KDD  1999 cup),  aiming to raise an alarm  in the case of DoS Neptune  attacks. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
3 Preliminaries 
	  
	  
	  
In this section,  we briefly describe a specific type of Recurrent Neural Network: 
Long Short Term Memory. The structure was proposed by Hochreiter  et al. [8] in 
1997, and has already  proven as a powerful technique  for addressing  the problem 
of time series prediction. 
The  difference initiated by LSTM  regarding  other  types  of RNN resides  in 
its “smart” nodes presented in Fig. 1. Each  of these  cells contains  three  gates, 
input  gate,  forget gate and output gate,  which decide how to react  to an input. 
Depending  on the  strength of the  information each node receives, it will decide 
to block it or pass it on. The information is also filtered with the set of weights 
associated  with the cells when it is transferred through these cells. 
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
Fig. 1.  LSTM  RNN  Cell, figure reproduced from [1] 
	  
	  
	  
The LSTM node structure enables a phenomenon  called backpropagation 
through time.  By  calculating for each  hidden  layer  the  partial  derivatives of 
the  output, weight  and  input  values,  the  system  can move backwards  to trace 
the  evolving error  between  real  output and  predicted  output. Afterwards, the 
network  uses the  derivative  of this  evolution  to adapt its weights  and  decrease 
prediction  error.  This learning  method  is named  Gradient Descent. 
As mentioned before, Long Short-Term Memory has the power to incorporate 
a behaviour  into a network by training it with normal data.  The system becomes 
representative of the variations of the data.  In other  words, a prediction  is made 
focusing on two features:  the value of a sample and its position  at specific time. 
This means that two input  samples at different times may have the same value, 
but  their  outputs will very probably  differ. It  is because  a LSTM  RNN is able 
to  use Back  Propagation through time  to  consider  the  past  of a sample,  and 
therefore  understand its context  better. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
4    Proposed Approach 
	  
In this section, we are going to describe a new approach to address  the problem 
of collective anomaly detection. Firstly,  we show the LSTM RNNs ability  to 
impregnate itself with  the  behaviour  of a training set,  and  in this  stage  it acts 
like a time  series anomaly  detection  model. We will then  adapt it for collective 
anomaly  detection  by introducing terms  that measure  its prediction  errors  in a 
period of time steps. Finally,  we shall describe how to seek a collective anomaly 
by combining  a LSTM RNN with a circular  array  method. 
	  
	  
4.1     LSTM RNN as a predictive vector 
	  
The first step inspires the idea presented in [12]: when trained correctly,  LSTM 
RNNs have the ability  to impregnate themselves  with the behavior  of a training 
set. Intuitively meaning  that when given a certain  input  samples, they have the 
ability  to  remember  the  context  of the  value  of the  samples,  and  to  predict  a 
coherent output in agreement with  the  context  of the  sample.  In our work, we 
will use a simple LSTM RNN, in opposition  to stacked  LSTM in [12]. This does 
not  change  the  core principle  of the  method:  when given sufficient  training, a 
LSTM  RNN  adapts its  weights,  which  become  representatives of the  training 
data. 
	  
	  
4.2     Definitions 
	  
In order to adapt a LSTM RNN for time series data  to detect  collective anoma- 
lies, we introduce  terms  to measure  prediction  errors  at  each time  step  or in a 
period of time steps.  These terms  are defined as below. 
	  
–   Relative Error  (RE): the  Relative  Error  between  two real values x and 
y is given by Eq. 1: 
RE (x, y) = |x ­−  y|  
x 
	  
(1) 
–  Relative Error  Threshold (RET): Relative Error value above a predeter- 
mined threshold  indicates  an anomaly.  This  threshold, RET , is determined 
by using labeled normal  and attacks from a validation set. 
–  Minimum Attack Time (MAT): The  minimum  amount  of recent  time 
steps that is used to define a collective attack. 
–  Danger Coefficient (DC): The  density  of anomalous  points  within  the 
last  M AT  time  steps.  Let  N  be the  number  of anomalous  points  over the 
last  M AT  time steps,  DC  is defined as in Eq. 2. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
NB: 0 < DC < 1 
	  
DC = N 
M AT 
	  
(2) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
–  The  Averaged Relative Error  (ARE): The Average Relative  Error  over 
a M AT  is given by Eq. 3: 
	  
	  
ARE = 
	  
M AT    
REi  (3) 
i=1 
	  
	  
	  
 
	  
Fig. 2.  Circular Array  for Collective  Anomaly  Detection model,  M AT  = P . 
	  
	  
The values of two terms,  Danger Coefficient  and Average Relative  Error, are 
the keys factors that will help the model to decide whether  a set of inputs  within 
a number  of the latest  time steps is collective anomaly or not as described in 4.3. 
These values will be estimated by using validation set. 
	  
	  
4.3     Degree of error  evaluation 
	  
At each time  step,  the  sample  predicted  by the  LSTM  RNN is compared  with 
the  real  future  sample.  This  comparison  is computed as  a  RE   value.  In  this 
sense, a “Relative  Error  time series” is built  in live. Based on the observation of 
a validation set, we can initialize  value for the RET . 
At this stage, our system is theoretically capable of detecting  point anomalies 
at  each time  step.  In order  to adapt the  model from a individually  anomaly  to 
collective anomaly,  we must  consider  simultaneously an ensemble  of points.  To 
do  this,  we propose  a  circular  array  containing   the  M AT   latest  error  values 
to  represent  the  level of anomaly  of the  latest  time  steps  as shown  in Fig.  2. 
By analyzing  the circular  array  at every time step, we evaluate  the possibility  of 
facing a collective anomaly. A collective anomaly will be identified if both Danger 
Coefficient  and Average Relative  Error  are higher than  predefined thresholds, α 
and β, respectively.  It is formulated in Eq. 4 and 5 as below. 
	  
DC > α  (4) 
	  
	  
ARE > β (5) 
	  
	  
	  
	  
where α and β will be estimated by using the validation set. 
Once  training  is terminated, the  thresholds  and  parameters of the  LSTM 
network  will be adjusted correctly  (in  order  to  obtain  a satisfactory error  de- 
crease).  The  model should be able to determine with good efficiency whether  a 
set of points  represents a collective anomaly. 
	  
	  
5    Experiments 
	  
5.1     Datasets 
	  
In  order  to  demonstrate the  efficient  performance  of the  proposed  model,  we 
choose a dataset related  to network  security  domain,  the KDD 1999 dataset [2, 
9], for our experiments. The dataset in tcpdump format  was collected from a 
simulated military-like  environment over a period of 5 weeks. There are four main 
groups  of attacks in the  dataset, but  we restrict our experiments on a specific 
attack, Neptune,  in Denial-of-Service  (DoS).  The  dataset is also converted  into 
time  series  version  before  feeding  into  the  model.  More  details  about  how to 
obtain a time series version from the original dataset, and how to choose training, 
validation and testing  sets are presented in the following paragraphs. 
The  first  crucial  step  is to  build  a conveniently  usable  time  series dataset 
out  of the  tcpdump data,  and  selecting  the  features  we wish to  use.  We  use 
terminal   commands  and  a  python   program  to  convert  the  original  tcpdump 
records in the KDD 1999 dataset into a time dependant function.  This method 
is a development of the proposed transformation in [11] that acts directly  on the 
tcpdump to obtain  real time statistics of the data.  Our scheme follows this step 
by step transition as described  below: 
tcpdump ⇒  pcap ⇒  csv 
	  
Each day of records can be time-filtered  and input  into a new .pcap file. This 
also has the advantage of giving a first approach on visualizing the data  by using 
Wireshark  functionalities (IO graphs  and  filters).  Once this  is done, the  tshark 
command  is adapted to  select  and  transfer  the  relevant  information from  the 
records into a .csv file. We may note that doing this is a first step towards  faster 
computation and better system  efficiency, since all irrelevant pcap columns can 
be ignored.  There  are two major  steps for the conversion  processing. 
	  
1.  Store  the  information of a .tcpdump  file into  a newly generated .pcap  file. 
From  the terminal, we use the editcap command: 
	  
editcap -A ’1999-03-11 08:00:00’ -B’1999-03-11 18:00:00’ 
Thursday2outside.tcpdump Thursday2.pcap 
2.  Convert  from .pcap file into .csv file by tshark command. 
From  the terminal  again,  type the command  below: 
	  
tshark -r Thursday2.pcap -T fields -e frame.number -e frame.len 
-e frame.time -e ip.proto -E header=y -E separator=, -E quote=d 
-E occurrence=f -i netstat -f tcp[13]==12 > Thursday2.csv 
	  
	  
	  
	  
tshark is a simple but  powerful command,  enabling  the selection of columns 
of interest in a .pcap file, and  their  output in a newly generated  .csv. Once the 
data  is in the .csv format,  python  code can be implemented from the XX library 
to store it and use with our classifier. 
Processing  the  tcpdump with  this  method  enables  quick  and  easy  manip- 
ulation  of the  data.   For  example,  Neptune  and  Smurf  are  both  DoS attacks 
caracterized by a high flow of specific packets  in networks  (eg. SYN ACK and 
ICMP  echo replies). By using this simple fact, the needed records can be filtered 
and  counted  at  every time  step.  If we aim to detect  Neptune  attack, the  thark 
command  can  be implemented with  the  ­−i netstat ­−f  tcp[13] == 2 filter,  so 
only SYN ACK packets from servers are counted.  We observe in the case of KDD 
1999 that a Neptune  attack can be sought by looking for an anomalously  high 
number  of these packets. 
The KDD1999 time series is composed of a two-weeks training set n1  (weeks 
1 & 3, normal  data), one week of validation set v1  (week 2, both  labeled normal 
and anomaly data), and a two-weeks of testing  set t1 (weeks 4 & 5). The protocol 
will be the  following: training the  network  with  n1 , using v1  to determine  our 
error threshold(s), and evaluating the proposed  model on t1 . 
	  
	  
 
	  
Fig. 3.  The  training errors  from the  model  with  one, two and  three  inputs. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
5.2  Experimental Settings 
	  
In this work, we conduct  two experiments, one preliminary experiment and one 
main experiment. The preliminary experiment is aim to estimate  the parameters 
	  
	  
	  
	  
for the models and set its thresholds  by using the validation set whereas the main 
experiment is to evaluate  the proposed  model. 
Preliminary Experiment: 
This  experiment  is aim  to  select  the  best  parameters of our  LSTM  RNN 
model with  respect to minimize  its prediction  error,  and  determine the  thresh- 
olds, α and  β. Firstly,  we determine how many  the  previous  time  steps  should 
be used for predicting  the current event.  The hyper-parameters of LSTM RNN, 
hidden  size and  learning  rate,  is then  estimated. Finally,  the  two thresholds, α 
and β, will be estimated with respect to a good classification  performance  of the 
model on the validation set. 
In order  to optimize  the  proposed  model for the  main  experiment, we pro- 
ceed to a preliminary test  to measure  the  influence of the  number  of inputs  on 
the prediction  error of LSTM. We first focus on how many  inputs  will influence 
the  prediction  of an LSTM  [12]. More specifically, they  show that a sample  xt 
input  at time t will be predicted  with reasonable  accuracy yt+1 . We emit the hy- 
pothesis  that inserting  more values in our system  may help decrease prediction 
errors, but it leads to more time consuming. Thus, we investigate the relationship 
between  the  prediction  value yt+1 to three  sets of the  previous  input  examples 
(xt ), (xt , xt−1 ), (xt , xt−1 , xt−2 ). They  are formulated in equations  6, 7 and 8 be- 
low: 
yt+1 = f (xt ) (6) 
	  
	  
yt+1 = f (xt , xt−1 ) (7) 
	  
	  
yt+1 = f (xt , xt−1 , xt−2 ) (8) 
where  xt ,  xt−1  and  xt−2  are  the  input   samples  at  times  t, t ­−  1 and  t ­−  2 
respectively,  and yt+1 is the predicted  value for the input  xt . 
The number  of hidden  nodes and the  learning  rate  are the  final two param- 
eters  that can highly influence the  performance  of a LSTM  RNN.  On the  one 
hand,  the strength of a LSTM RNN resides in its hidden  layer. Each synapse  of 
a network  is weighted  differently,  and can be considered  as a unique interpreta- 
tion  of the  input  data.  Each  node of the  hidden  layer is storage  space for these 
interpretations. Theoretically, the higher number  of hidden  nodes, the more in- 
formation  the network can contain.  This also means more computation, and may 
lead to over-fitting. 
Using the  LSTM RNN error  evolution  curve empirically,  we concluded  that 
the optimum number of nodes in our hidden layer to obtain good memorization is 
approximatively 23. The learning rate is other factor directly linked to the speed 
at  which a LSTM  RNN  can  improve  its  predictions. For  a time  step  t during 
training, the  synapse  weights  of our neural  network  are updated. The  learning 
rate  defines how much  we wish a weight to be modified at  each instant. In our 
experiment, we choose learning  rate  equal  to  0.01  that gives us a convenient 
error curve. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Finally,  the  classifier that is trained on ten  days  of normal  data  is used to 
determine α and  β. We observe the  reaction  of the  system  on labeled  Neptune 
attacks from  the  validation set,  and  set  the  thresholds. The  values  of these 
thresholds  is shown in Section 6. 
Main Experiment: 
Our  task  is to use the  potential speed and  accuracy  of LSTM  RNN  to de- 
tect a disproportionate durable change in a time series. Once the preliminary 
experiment is complete,  we choose the most performant LSTM RNN, and train 
it  with  the  normal  training set  n1 . The  classifier is then  evaluated on testing 
set t1 containing  both  normal  and attack data  to investigate how efficiently our 
proposed  classifier performs. 
	  
	  
6    Results and  Discussion 
	  
This  section  presents  our  experimental results.  First, the  preliminary experi- 
ment evaluates  two factors:  computation cost and LSTM prediction  error when 
using one input,  two inputs  and three inputs  respectively.  Then, the general 
performance  in terms  of classification  accuracy  is measured. 
	  
	  
 
	  
Fig. 4.  The  prediction error  from the  model  with  three  inputs (1500 Epochs). 
	  
	  
The  Table  1 illustrates that the  model with  three  inputs  had  less computa- 
tional  time  than  those with one or two inputs.  Moreover, the Fig. 3 shows that 
	  
	  
	  
	  
the model with three  inputs  achieve a lower training error in comparison  to two 
others.  Thus,  we use the model with three  inputs  for our main experiment. 
	  
	  
Table 1.  Computational time  recording 
	  
Number of  inputs Computational time (seconds) 
1 645.455811 
2 652.4613178 
3 642.7698278 
	  
	  
The results  from the main experiment are shown in Table 2. The experiment 
is done  with  M AT   = 12, and  α  = 0.66,  and  we also  report  the  results  on 
four values of β, β = 0.69, 0.66, 0.62 and  0.52. We observe that it is possible to 
obtain  100% collective anomaly  detection rate,  but  this  infers triggering  a high 
amount of false alarms.  Conversely,  it is possible to avoid false alarms,  but  less 
correct  alarms  will be detected. Ultimately, detecting  more real attacks results 
in triggering  more false alarms  as shown in Table  2. 
	  
	  
Table 2.  Circular array  detection  efficiency 
	  
Threshold β Percentage of  correct alarms triggered 
Number of  false 
alarms triggered 
0.69 
0.66 
0.62 
0.52 
86% 
94% 
98% 
100% 
0 
2 
16 
63 
	  
	  
	  
	  
7    Conclusion and  Further work 
	  
In this paper,  we have proposed  a model for collective anomaly  detection  based 
on Long Short-Term Memory  Recurrent  Neural  Network.  We  have  motivated 
this  method  through investigating LSTM  RNN  in the  problem  of time  series, 
and  adapted it  to  detect  collective  anomaly  by  proposing  the  measurements 
in 4.2. We investigated the hyper-parameters, the suitable  number  of inputs  and 
some thresholds  by using the validation set. 
The proposed model is evaluated by using the time series version of the KDD 
1999 dataset. The  results  suggest  that proposed  model is efficiently capable  of 
detecting   collective  anomalies  the  dataset. However,  they  must  be  used  with 
caution.  The  training data  fed into  a network  must  be organized  in a coherent 
manner  to guarantee the  stability of the  system.  In future  work, we will focus 
on how to  improve  the  classification  accuracy  of the  model.  We also observed 
that implementing variations in a LSTM RNNs number  of inputs  might trigger 
different output reactions. 
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